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Francesca Parise, Asuman Ozdaglar
Abstract— We investigate the sensitivity of the Nash equi-
librium of constrained network aggregative games to changes
in exogenous parameters affecting the cost function of the
players. This setting is motivated by two applications. The
first is the analysis of interventions by a social planner with
a networked objective function while the second is network
routing games with atomic players and information constraints.
By exploiting a primal reformulation of a sensitivity analysis
result for variational inequalities, we provide a characterization
of the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium that depends on
primal variables only. To derive this result we assume strong
monotonicity of the mapping associated with the game. As the
second main result, we derive sufficient conditions that guar-
antee this strong monotonicity property in network aggregative
games. These two characterizations allows us to systematically
study changes in the Nash equilibrium due to perturbations or
parameter variations in the two applications mentioned above.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network aggregative games (NAGs) are games in which
the cost function of each agent depends on its own strategy
and on an aggregate of the strategies of its neighbours,
as defined by an underlying interaction network. NAGs
are used to model a vast range of applications spanning
from sociology [1] and economics [2] to traffic [3] and
energy markets [4], [5]. In many cases, the resulting models
depend on a vector of parameters that might represent either
some exogenous factor in the case of social applications
(e.g. rumors in opinion dynamics or shocks in financial
networks) or a tuning variable in the case of technological
applications (e.g. road improvements in traffic networks or
the price elasticity in energy markets). In both cases, to fully
understand (and possibly control) the behaviour of the system
it is important to study the effect that variations of such
parameters have on the final outcome of the game. As a first
step in this direction, we here focus on the sensitivity of the
Nash equilibrium to small changes in the cost functions.
Our first main contribution is the derivation of a general
sensitivity result for the Nash equilibrium of games with
constraints. To this end, we use an implicit function theorem
type of argument to get a sensitivity result for the KKT
system of the variational inequality associated with the
game, as done in [6]. Our key idea is then to do a primal
reformulation to get a sensitivity result that involves only
the decision variables (i.e., the players strategies) and not
the dual variables. This reformulation in terms of primal
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variables only is new to the best of our knowledge and
allows us to derive useful insights for two important classes
of NAGs discussed next. The only other formulation in terms
of primal variables that we are aware of is derived in [7].
Therein, however, a more general setup is assumed and, as
a consequence, the obtained formula conceals the effect of
the constraints on the Nash equilibrium. This is, on the other
hand, immediate from our reformulation.
To derive our first result we need to assume strong
monotonicity of the operator of the variational inequality
associated with the game. As the second main contribution,
we derive two sufficient conditions to guarantee strong
monotonicity of this operator in the case of NAGs. The
formulation of NAGs that we use here is the one presented in
[8]. We note that sufficient conditions for the case of average
aggregative games, that is, games where the cost function of
each agent depends on the average of the whole population
(instead of the average of the neighbours) have been derived
in [9], [10] in terms of the cost function. The conditions for
NAGs that we derive here instead depend both on the cost
function and on the network.
The first specific class of NAGs that we consider is that of
quadratic network games [11]. Here we assume that for each
agent i there is a parameter yi that represents a small stochas-
tic perturbation or shock to the cost function of agent i.
Without interventions, these shocks would drive the system
from the initial Nash equilibrium x?(0) (in the absence of
shocks) to the new Nash equilibrium configuration x?(y). We
first show that the sensitivity results in [2] can be found as a
corollary of our main result. We then consider a controlled
setting in which a central authority can intervene on the
system and guarantee that the strategy of one agent k in the
new equilibrium is the same as in the case without shocks.
In other words, we assume that the central authority can
impose the constraint x?k(y) = x
?
k(0). We use our main
result to characterize which agent should be selected by the
central authority to minimize the effect of the shocks on the
whole system. As a corollary of this analysis, if the adjacency
matrix of the network is non-negative, one can recover the
key-player result derived in [12] for linear-quadratic network
games. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach
on a model of rumor spreading in opinion dynamics. Other
applications of quadratic network games where our results
could apply are production networks and systemic risk in
financial networks as described in [2] or crime, education
and urban dynamics as described in [11], [12].
The second specific class of NAGs that we consider is
that of atomic routing games [3]. Specifically, we consider
games where each player is a user that needs to allocate a
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fixed amount of splittable flow from a given origin to a given
destination on a traffic network. The cost function of each
user is its travel time, which depends on the strategy of the
other users because of congestion effects. Here we assume
that there is one parameter ye for each road e of the traffic
network. Variations of the parameter ye are determined by a
central authority and model the effort made by the authority
to reduce the travel time on road e. Our objective is to
characterise which road should the central authority improve
to optimize the system performance (i.e. to reduce the total
travel time for all the users). Besides the natural network flow
constraints, we additionally use constraints to model the fact
that the users might have different sets of information on the
network, as motivated in [13]. For example different agents
may know different subsets of roads. Finally, we note that
the standard sensitivity results derived in [14], [15], [16],
[17] do not apply in our setting because, on the one hand,
we consider agents with information constraints and, on the
other hand, we consider atomic agents (i.e., we focus on the
Nash equilibrium instead of the Wardrop equilibrium).
Besides the already mentioned works, our results have
strong connections with sensitivity results of Nash equilibria
that have been derived in the economics literature (referred
to as comparative statics). Most of the economics literature
has focused on games with specific ordering properties (e.g.,
games with strategic complements/substitutes as discussed in
[18], [19]) or games where the aggregate of the strategies is
a scalar quantity (e.g., scalar aggregative games have been
treated in [20], [21], [22]). The main difference of our work
from this line of results is that we consider explicitly the
effect of the constraints.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we introduce network aggregative games and our main result
on sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium in constrained games.
In Section III we derive two sufficient conditions for strong
monotonicity in NAGs. In Section IV and V we show how
these results can be applied to quadratic network games and
atomic routing games, respectively.
Notation: We denote the Jacobian of a function f(x) :
Rn → Rd by ∇xf(x) ∈ Rd×n. Given a, b ∈ N, N[a, b]
denotes the set of integer numbers in the interval [a, b]. In
denotes the n-dimensional identity matrix, 1n the vector of
unit entries and ei the ith canonical vector. Given A ∈ Rn×n
not necessarily symmetric, A  0 ( 0) ⇔ x>Ax > 0 (≥
0), ∀x 6= 0, A(k,:) denotes the kth row of A, ρ(A) denotes the
spectral radius of A and Λ(A) its spectrum. A⊗B denotes
the Kronecker product and [A;B] := [A>, B>]>. Given N
matrices {Ai}Ni=1, blkdiag(A1, . . . , AN ) is the block diago-
nal matrix whose ith block is Ai. Given N vectors xi ∈ Rn,
[x1; . . . ;xN ] := [xi]Ni=1 := [x
1>, . . . , xN>]> ∈ RNn. |E|
denotes the cardinality of the set E .
II. NETWORK AGGREGATIVE GAMES
A. The model
We consider a game with N players that are interacting
over a network with non-negative adjacency matrix P , [8].
We assume Pii = 0 for all i ∈ N[1, N ]. We say that j is a
neighboor of i if Pij > 0. The set of neighbours of player i
is denoted by N i. Each player i ∈ N[1, N ] aims at selecting
a vector strategy xi ∈ Rn among its feasible set X i ⊆ Rn
to minimize a cost function
J i(xi, zi(x), yi), (1)
which depends on its own strategy xi, on the linear combina-
tion of the neighbours strategies according to the coefficients
of the network
zi(x) :=
∑n
j=1 Pijx
j =
∑
j∈N i Pijx
j
and on a parameter yi ∈ Yi ⊆ Rdi . Let y := [yi]Ni=1
and Y = Y1 × . . . × YN . For each admissible parameter
vector y ∈ Y we refer to the game with N players and cost
functions as in (1) as the network aggregative game (NAG)
with parameter y and we denote it by G(y). We assume
that for each y ∈ Y , the game G(y) satisfies the following
regularity conditions.
Assumption 1 (Constraints): The constraint sets can be
expressed as X i := {xi ∈ Rn | Bixi ≤ bi, Hixi = hi},
for some Bi ∈ Rmi×n, bi ∈ Rmi , Hi ∈ Rpi×n, hi ∈ Rpi .
There exists xi ∈ X i such that Bixi < bi.
In the following, we define x := [xi]Ni=1 ∈ RNn the
vector whose i-th block component is the strategy of agent i.
We also define m :=
∑N
i=1mi, p :=
∑N
i=1 pi, B :=
blkdiag(B1, . . . , BN ) ∈ Rm×Nn, b = [bi]Ni=1 ∈ Rm, H :=
blkdiag(H1, . . . ,HN ) ∈ Rp×Nn, h = [hi]Ni=1 ∈ Rp, so that
X := X 1 × . . .×XN = {x ∈ RNn | Bx ≤ b,Hx = h}.
Assumption 2 (Cost function): For all yi ∈ Yi, the func-
tion xi 7→ J i(xi, zi(x), yi) is twice continuously differen-
tiable and strongly convex in xi for all i ∈ N[1, N ] and for
all x−i ∈ X−i. Moreover, [xi; zi] 7→ J i(xi, zi, yi) is twice
continuously differentiable in [xi; zi].
In the rest of the paper we are going to study properties
of the Nash equilibrium of the game G(y), as defined next.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium): A set of strategies
{x?i(y) ∈ X i}Ni=1 is a Nash equilibrium of the game G(y)
if for all players i ∈ N[1, N ] we have that for all xi ∈ X i
J i(x?i(y),
∑
j∈Ni Pijx
?j(y), yi)
≤ J i(xi,∑j∈Ni Pijx?j(y), yi).
B. Connection between game theory and variational in-
equalities
We start by recalling an equivalent characterization of the
Nash equilibrium of a generic game (i.e. not necessarily a
NAG) in terms of variational inequalities.
Definition 2 (Variational inequality): A vector x¯ ∈ Rn
solves the variational inequality VI(X , f) with set X ⊆ Rn
and operator f(x) : X → Rn if and only if
f(x¯)>(x− x¯) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X .
To this end, we define the operator F (x, y) : X × Y →
RNn whose i-th block component is the gradient of the cost
function of agent i with respect to its own strategy for the
game G(y). Mathematically,
F (x, y) := [∇xiJ i(xi, zi(x), yi)>]Ni=1. (2)
This operator is of fundamental importance in the subsequent
analysis because of the following well known relation.
Proposition 1 (VI and KKT system): Under Assumptions
1 and 2 the following statements are equivalent
1) a vector of strategies x?(y) is a Nash equilibrium for
the game G(y);
2) x?(y) solves the VI(X , F (·, y));
3) there exists λ(y) ∈ Rm and µ(y) ∈ Rp such that
F (x?(y), y) +B>λ(y) +H>µ(y) = 0 (3a)
Hx?(y) = h, λ(y)>(Bx?(y)− b) = 0, (3b)
Bx?(y) ≤ b, λ(y) ≥ 0. (3c)
Proof: This is a classic result, see e.g. [23, Eq (18)],
[24, Proposition 1.3.4 and 3.2.1].
In the following, we are going to focus on games for
which the operator F (x, y) is strongly monotone according
to the following definition. Sufficient conditions for strong
monotonicity to hold in the case of NAGs are derived in
Section III.
Definition 3: An operator f(x) : X ⊆ Rn → Rn is
strongly monotone in X if there exists α > 0 such that
(f(x1)−f(x2))>(x1−x2) ≥ α‖x1−x2‖2 for all x1, x2 ∈ X .
Equivalently, for all x ∈ X , ∇xf(x)+∇xf(x)>2  αIn, [24,
Proposition 2.3.2].
Assumption 3 (Strong monotonicity): The operator
[x, y] 7→ F (x, y) as defined in (2) is continuously
differentiable in [x, y] ∈ X ×Y and it is strongly monotone
in x ∈ X for any fixed y ∈ Y .
C. Main sensitivity analysis result for constrained games
We here present our main sensitivity analysis result which
holds for any game (i.e. not necessarily a NAG) with
constraints satisfying the following assumption.
Assumption 4 (Constraint qualification): Given a param-
eter y¯ ∈ Y and the corresponding Nash equilibrium x?(y¯)
let B0, b0 be the matrices obtained by deleting from B, b all
the rows corresponding to constraints that are not active at
x?(y¯) (i.e. the rows k ∈ N[1,m] such that B(k,:)x?(y¯) < bk).
Let A := [B0;H] and a := [b0, h]. We assume that: 1) A
has full row rank; 2) the strict complementarity slackness
condition λk(y¯) > 0 when B(k,:)x?(y¯) = bk is satisfied.1
We note that Assumption 4 is automatically satisfied if
only equality constraints are present.
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are
satisfied. Then for all y ∈ Y the game G(y) admits a unique
Nash equilibrium x?(y). If additionally Assumption 4 holds
for y¯ ∈ Y then x?(y) is locally differentiable at y¯ and
∇yx?(y¯) = −M [∇yF (x, y)]{x=x?(y¯),y=y¯} (4)
where
M := [L− LA>[ALA>]−1AL],
L := [∇xF (x, y)]−1{x=x?(y¯),y=y¯}
(5)
and A is as defined in Assumption 4. Moreover, M  0.
1Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 4.1, the dual variable λ(y¯) is unique, as
shown in the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof: The fact that under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3
the Nash equilibrium x?(y) of the game G(y) exists and is
unique comes from existence and uniqueness of the solution
of VI(X , F (·, y)), [24]. Set w(y) = [x?(y);λ(y);µ(y)]
where λ(y), µ(y) are the multipliers associated with x?(y),
as in (3). The fact that, under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4,
w(y) and thus x?(y) are locally unique and differentiable is
known, [6, Theorem 7.16]. The formula for the derivative of
the vector w(y) provided therein is
∇yw(y¯) = −[∇wΓ(w, y)]−1[∇yΓ(w, y)] |{w=w(y¯),y=y¯},
where Γ(w, y) is the KKT system obtained by considering
only the equalities in (3a) and (3b), see [6, Eq. (7.126)] for
more details. Note that in general the formula for ∇yx?(y¯)
obtained from the first block component of ∇yw(y¯) depends
on the dual variables λ(y¯), µ(y¯). By considering only the
active constraints instead of the whole KKT system we
here derive an equivalent formula for ∇yx?(y¯) that does
not depend explicitly on such dual variables. This primal
reformulation allows us to derive the results discussed in the
next sections. To this end, we note that if Assumption 4 holds
for a fixed y¯ ∈ Y then, by Theorem 7.16 in [6], in a neigh-
bourhood of y¯, the set of active constraints is unchanged,
strict complementarity holds and the active constraints can
thus be rewritten as Ax = a. Consequently, a vector x?(y)
is a Nash equilibrium in a neighbourhood of y¯ if and only
if there exists a multiplier η(y) := [λ>0(y);µ(y)] such that
the following reduced KKT system holds
F (x?(y), y) +A>η(y) = 0
Ax?(y)− a = 0 (6)
where λ>0(y) is the subvector of λ(y) obtained by selecting
only the components that are strictly positive. Since w(y) is
differentiable in y, we can differentiate (6) with respect to y
thus obtaining
∇xF (x?(y), y)∇yx?(y) +∇yF (x?(y), y) +A>∇yη(y) = 0
A∇yx?(y) = 0
From the first equivalence it follows
∇yx?(y) = −L[∇yF (x?(y), y) +A>∇yη(y)]. (7)
Note that L is well defined since F (x, y) strongly monotone
implies that ∇xF (x, y) is positive definite and thus invert-
ible. Substituting (7) in the second equation we get
∇yη(y) = −(ALA>)−1[AL∇yF (x?(y), y)]
and finally substituting back into (7), we get formula (4).
Note that ALA> is invertible since A has full row rank by
Assumption 4.1. By Shur complement M  0 iff the matrix[
L LA>
AL ALA>
]
= [ IA ]L [ I A
> ]  0. The last inequality holds
since L is the inverse of a positive definite matrix.
III. SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR STRONG
MONOTONICITY IN NAGS
In this section we consider a fixed parameter y and we
study the properties of the mapping x 7→ F (x, y) associated
with the specific NAG G(y). We note that continuous differ-
entiability of F (x, y) is a trivial consequence of Assumptions
1 and 2.
Our second main result is to derive two sufficient con-
ditions, in terms of game primitives only, for the operator
of a NAG to be strongly monotone, thus guaranteeing
Assumption 3. To this end, let us define
κ1(x, y) := min
i
λmin(∇2xiJ i(xi, zi, yi) |zi=zi(x)) (8)
κ2(x, y) := max
i
‖∇2xiziJ i(xi, zi, yi) |zi=zi(x) ‖, (9)
where ∇2xiJ i(xi, zi, yi) is the Hessian of the cost function
of player i with respect to xi while ∇2xiziJ i(xi, zi, yi) is the
Jacobian of ∇xiJ i(xi, zi, yi)> with respect to zi. Note that
by Assumption 2, the Hessian ∇2xiJ i(xi, zi, yi) |zi=zi(x) 0
hence κ1(x, y) > 0 for all x and y. We state the two sufficient
conditions in the next assumption.
Assumption 5 (Conditions for strong monotonicity):
Consider a fixed y ∈ Y . Suppose that
α(y) := min
x
(κ1(x, y)− κ2(x, y)w(P )) > 0 (10)
where
1) w(P ) = |λmin(P )| if the following conditions hold2
a) P = P>
b) ∇2xiziJ i(xi, zi, yi) |zi=zi(x)= κ2(x, y)In for all i,
for all x ∈ X .
2) w(P ) = ‖P‖, otherwise.
Theorem 2 (Continuity and strong monotonicity): If As-
sumptions 1 and 2 hold then the operator x 7→ F (x, y)
as defined in (2) is continuously differentiable in x. If
additionally Assumption 5 holds for a given y ∈ Y , then
x 7→ F (x, y) is strongly monotone in X , with monotonicity
constant α(y).
Proof: By assumption, [xi; zi] 7→ J i(xi, zi, yi)
is twice continuously differentiable hence [xi; zi] 7→
∇xiJ i(xi, zi, yi) is continuously differentiable in [xi; zi].
Note that zi(x) =
∑
j∈N i Pijx
j is a linear function of
x. Consequently, x 7→ ∇xiJ i(xi, zi(x), yi) is continuously
differentiable in x. This proves that x 7→ F (x, y) is continu-
ously differentiable for x ∈ X . To prove strong monotonicity,
we start by noticing that the operator ∇xF (x, y) can be
rewritten as follows
∇xF (x, y) = D(x, y) +K(x, y)G, (11)
where
D(x, y) := blkdiag[∇2xiJ i(xi, zi, yi) |zi=zi(x)]Ni=1 (12)
K(x, y) := blkdiag[∇2xiziJ i(xi, zi, yi) |zi=zi(x)]Ni=1 (13)
G := P ⊗ In. (14)
2Note that under condition 1-a) P is a symmetric, non-negative matrix
with zero diagonal. Since P = P> all its eigenvalues are real. By Perron-
Frobenius theorem λmax(P ) = ρ(P ) > 0. Moreover, since P has zero
diagonal, Tr(P ) =
∑
i λi(P ) = 0. Consequently, it must be λmin(P ) < 0.
Note that by the properties of the Hessian D(x, y) =
D(x, y)>. Moreover by definition (8), D(x, y)  κ1(x, y)I
for all x ∈ X and all y ∈ Y . By (11) it then holds
∇xF (x,y)+∇xF (x,y)>
2  κ1(x, y)I+K(x,y)G+G
>K(x,y)>
2 .
Note that
• under Assumption 5.1) the matrices K(x, y) and G are
symmetric, moreover K(x, y) = κ2(x, y)INn  0.
By assumption, P is a non-negative, symmetric ma-
trix with zero diagonal. It follows that λmin(P ) < 0
and λmax(P ) = ρ(P ), as detailed in the footnote 2.
Moreover, by the properties of the Kronecker prod-
uct, Λ(G) = Λ(P ). Hence λmin(G) = λmin(P ) =
−|λmin(P )|. Consequently,
λmin
(
K(x,y)G+G>K(x,y)>
2
)
= κ2(x, y)λmin
(
G+G>
2
)
= κ2(x, y)λmin(G) = −|λmin(P )|‖K(x, y)‖.
(15)
• Under Assumption 5.2)
λmin
(
K(x, y)G+G>K(x, y)>
2
)
≥ −ρ
(
K(x, y)G+G>K(x, y)>
2
)
= −‖K(x, y)G+G
>K(x, y)>
2
‖
≥ −‖K(x, y)G‖+ ‖G
>K(x, y)>‖
2
= −‖K(x, y)G‖ ≥ −‖P‖‖K(x, y)‖.
where we used the fact that for symmetric matrices the
spectral radius equals the 2-norm and ‖G‖ = ‖P ⊗
In‖ = ‖P‖.
Hence in all cases it holds
λmin
(
K(x, y)G+G>K(x, y)>
2
)
≥ −w(P )‖K(x, y)‖.
Note that
‖K(x, y)‖ ≤ max
i
‖∇2xiziJ i(xi, zi, yi) |zi=zi(x) ‖ = κ2(x, y),
since the norm of a block diagonal matrix equals the largest
norm of its blocks. Using the last result we can immediately
see that under Assumption 5
λmin(κ1(x, y)I +
K(x,y)G+G>K(x,y)>
2 )
= κ1(x, y) + λmin(
K(x,y)G+G>K(x,y)>
2 )
≥ κ1(x, y)− κ2(x, y)w(P ) ≥ α(y).
Hence
∇xF (x,y)+∇xF (x,y)>
2  λmin(κ1(x, y)I + K(x,y)G+G
>K(x,y)>
2 )I
 α(y)I.
(16)
Equation (16) implies that F (x, y) is strongly monotone with
constant α(y).
IV. QUADRATIC NETWORK GAMES
A. The setting
Consider the specific class of NAGs with cost functions
J i(xi, zi(x), yi) =
1
2
(xi)>Inxi − f(zi(x) + yi)>xi, (17)
for some f : Rn → Rn. Games with such cost functions are
known in the literature under the name of quadratic network
games [2, Section 2.1] (or linear-quadratic network games
if additionally the interaction function is linear [11, Section
4.1]). For such class of games, the parameter yi ∈ Yi ⊆ Rn
usually represents a localized shock or perturbation to the
payoff of agent i. In the following, we assume that these
shocks yi are small, independently and identically distributed
and have mean yˆ.
If the strategy of the agents are unconstrained (i.e. X i =
Rn) and Pii = 0 for all i ∈ [1, N ] then each agent’s best
response can be characterized explicitly as
xibr(z
i(x), yi) = f(zi(x) + yi).
By using this reformulation, the recent work [2] conducted
sensitivity analysis of the Nash equilibrium and studied
volatility of aggregates to shocks (perturbations) in uncon-
strained quadratic games. We briefly recap such results in
Section IV-B and show that they can be recovered as a special
case of our main formula (4).
In Section IV-C we exploit formula (4) to extend the
results of [2] to the constrained case. In this setting, con-
straints emerge, for example, when a central authority has
an objective function that depends on the exact structure of
the network (such as minimizing the difference between the
actions of a subset of agents over part of the network or
keeping the actions or beliefs of certain agents unchanged).
Following [2], we model the aggregate output of the system
as
s(y) = g(h(x?1(y)) + . . .+ h(x?N (y))),
where h : Rn → Rn and g : Rn → R. Note that,
in the absence of shocks the Nash equilibrium is x?(0)
with associated output s(0). Suppose now that the central
authority can intervene and guarantee that, no matter what
the realization of the shocks, one agent does not change its
strategy.3 This intervention can be modeled by adding the
constraint xk = x?k(0) to the game. Note that this constraint
does not modify the unperturbed system output, but modifies
how the system reacts to shocks. Our objective is to address
the following question: Which agent should be constrained
by the central authority in order to minimize the effect of the
shocks on the system output s(y) at the new equilibrium? By
exploiting formula (4) we provide an answer to this question
both from an ex-post perspective (i.e., if the central authority
knows the actual realization y of the shock) and from an ex-
ante perspective (i.e., if the authority must commit to his
decision before the shock is realized).
3We focus on one agent for simplicity. Similar results can be derived also
for the case when the central authority can influence more than one agent.
In the following we focus our discussion on the scalar
case, formula (4) however allows an immediate generaliza-
tion of our results to the multidimentional case. We also as-
sume the following regularity conditions and normalizations.
Assumption 6: (Network games) The adjacency matrix P
of the network is non-negative and, for each i ∈ N[1, N ],
Pii = 0. Moreover, f(0) = g(0) = h(0) = 0. For each
w ∈ R, 0 ≤ f ′(w) ≤ γ and γ‖P‖ < 1.
Note that the previous assumption implies that the game is
normalized so that, in the absence of shocks, the equilibrium
state x?(0) and the output of the system s(0) are both zero.
Moreover, Theorem 2 guarantees that under Assumption 6,
Assumption 3 is satisfied.
B. The unconstrained case
In [2] the following formula for the Nash sensitivity in
unconstrained quadratic network games is derived
∇yix?(0) = f ′(0)[I − f ′(0)P ]−1ei =: f ′(0)Lei, (18)
so that ∂x
?j(0)
∂yi = f
′(0)Lji. (19)
The matrix L := [I − f ′(0)P ]−1 is known in the economic
literature as Leontief matrix. It follows from Assumption 6
that L is well defined (i.e. the inverse exists). By using
Neumann series it is also easy to see that L = [I −
f ′(0)P ]−1 =
∑∞
l=0 f
′(0)lP l. Consequently, the element
Lji is the sum over all the possible paths from i to j of
the product of the edge weights in the path discounted by
the factor f ′(0)l, where l is the path length. Intuitively the
element Lji describes the ways in which a shock applied to
agent i propagates to agent j. It is then immediate to see
that L has nonnegative entries and that Lii ≥ 1 (take l = 0).
The output sensitivity to a shock to agent i derived in [2]
is
∂s(0)
∂yi = f
′(0)g′(0)h′(0)
∑N
m=1 Lmi =: αv
i (20)
where α := f ′(0)g′(0)h′(0). It is evident from (20) that
whether a positive shock yi to agent i locally increases or
decreases the output depends only on the sign of α or in other
words on the convexity/concavity pattern of the functions
g, h at the origin [2]. The strength of such effect, on the
other hand, depends on the parameter vi :=
∑N
m=1 Lmi,
which is the Bonacich centrality of agent i.
Definition 4 (Bonacich centrality): The element vi :=∑N
m=1 Lmi, obtained by summing the entries of the Leontief
matrix in column i, is the Bonacich centrality of agent i.
Note that vi is always positive and corresponds to the
weighted sum of the paths through which the shock can
propagate from agent i to any other agent in the network.
C. The constrained case
Theorem 1 allow us to generalize formula (18) to the
constrained case. Specifically, under Assumptions 1 to 4 we
obtain
∇yix?(0) = f ′(0)[L− LA>[ALA>]−1AL]ei
= f ′(0)Lei − f ′(0)LA>[ALA>]−1ALei,
(21)
where L is the same Leontief matrix of equation (18). By
comparing (18) and (21), one can immediately see that the
presence of the constraints modifies the sensitivity in an
additive fashion. Similarly, the output sensitivity becomes
∂s(0)
∂yi = α[v
i − 1>LA>[ALA>]−1ALei]. (22)
We then see that the unconstrained case (i.e. when the A
matrix is empty) is just a special case of (21) and (22).
We next consider the case when the central authority adds
the specific constraint xk = x?k(0) = 0, as motivated in the
introduction of this section. Note that since this is an equality
constraint Assumption 4 is always met and A = e>k . If agent
k is constrained, a shock to an arbitrary agent i affects an
agent j according to
∂x?j(0 | k)
∂yi
= f ′(0)
[
Lji − LjkLki
Lkk
]
.
Note that the terms Lji and
LjkLki
Lkk
have always the same
sign, therefore fixing the strategy of an agent has the effect
of reducing the sensitivity to the shock for the others. The
relevance of such effect depends on the weight of the paths
from i to k and from k to j, normalized by the weight of
the loops passing through k. The output sensitivity becomes
∂s(0 | k)
∂yi
= α[
N∑
m=1
Lmi−
N∑
m=1
LmkLki
Lkk
] =: α[vi−vik] (23)
where we define vik := v
k Lki
Lkk
.
Lemma 1: For all i, k ∈ N[1, N ], vi ≥ vik.
Proof: Since L is a Leontief matrix, for any i, k, j ∈
N[1, N ] by [25] we have
LmiLkk − LmkLki ≥ 0⇒ Lmi ≥ LmkLkiLkk , (24)
where we used the fact that Lkk ≥ 1. By summing over all
m ∈ N[1, N ] we obtain the desired result.
Therefore constraining agent k attenuates the sensitivity of
the output but can never reverse its sign, which again depends
only on the sign of α.
By using (23) we can approximate the ex-post output,
given that agent k was constrained, as
s(y | k) ≈ s(0) +∑Ni=1 ∂s(0|k)∂yi yi = ∑Ni=1 α[vi − vik]yi.
In the following we are going to assume that α > 0
and shocks are non-negative yi ≥ 0. Similar results can be
derived for the other cases. Under these assumptions and
given Lemma 1, s(y | k) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ N[1, N ]. Since
s(0) = 0, to minimize the effect of the shocks the central
authority should constrain agent
k¯post :=argmink α
∑N
i=1[v
i − vik]yi =argmaxk
∑N
i=1v
i
ky
i.
Note that, to use this formula, the central authority needs to
know the realization y of the shock. If, on the other hand,
the central authority needs to commit to a decision ex-ante
then it should minimize the expected outcome
Ey[s(y | k)] ≈
∑N
i=1 α[v
i − vik]yˆ,
where we used E[yi] = yˆ for all i ∈ N[1, N ], and thus
constrain the opinion of agent
k¯ante :=argmink
∑N
i=1 α[v
i − vik]yˆ =argmaxk
∑N
i=1v
i
k
=: argmaxk w
k.
The quantity wk is known as inter-centrality or key-player
centrality.
Definition 5 (Key-player centrality): The element
wk :=
∑N
i=1 v
i
k =
∑N
i=1 v
k Lki
Lkk
= v
k
Lkk
∑N
i=1 Lki, (25)
where L is the Leontief matrix, is the inter-centrality or key-
player centrality of agent k.
This centrality measure was originally derived in [12], by
using a different approach, to identify the key-player to be
removed in an unconstrained quadratic-linear network game
with strategic complements to maximize the decrease in
aggregated output at equilibrium. The application considered
here is a different example of where such a measure can
be applied. To sum up, the optimal strategy for the central
authority is to target the agent with maximum inter-centrality
and not the one with maximum Bonacich centrality, contrary
to what one could have expected.
The example given in Figure 1 provides intuition for the
difference between the two measures.4 Therein we consider,
for different values of f ′(0), a directed network without
loops where all the edges have the same weight. Note that
in the absence of loops Lii = 1 for each agent i, hence
vi =
N∑
m=1
Lmi, w
i =
(
N∑
m=1
Lmi
)(
N∑
m=1
Lim
)
.
Recall that Lmi is the total weight of paths from node i to
node m, discounted by f ′(0)l, where l is the path length. A
first thing to note is that the Bonacich centrality vi only
depends on out-going paths, while the inter-centrality wi
depends on the product of both in-coming and out-going
paths. This explains why the latter is the relevant measure to
be considered in deciding which agent should be constrained.
In fact, constraining an agent has two effects. The first direct
effect is that the strategy of the agent influences all its
followers, the second indirect effect is that it blocks all the
shocks coming from previous nodes and prevents then from
spreading further over the network. It is then clear that the
relevance of an agent as an influencer (direct effect) depends
on its out-going paths, but its relevance as a blocker (indirect
effect) depends on the in-coming paths. One should then aim
at constraining an agent for which both effects are relevant.
A second thing to note is that how strong these effects are
depends on how strong the interaction is among the agents
(i.e. how large f ′(0) is). From the interpretation of f ′(0) as
a discount factor in Lmi we see that, when f ′(0) is very
small, only short paths are important. In the limit, for very
4A special case when the ordering according to the two centrality
measures coincides is the case of a symmetric network (i.e. Lki = Lik)
with no loops (Lkk = 1). In that case wk = v
k
Lkk
∑N
i=1 Lik =
(vk)2
Lkk
=
(vk)2. In general, however, the ordering is different, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
f'(0)=0.1 f'(0)=1
Fig. 1: Plot illustrating the difference between Bonacich and inter-
centrality measures for different values of f ′(0). The node color is
an indicator of the centrality of the agents.
small f ′(0), the Bonacich centrality of an agent i is its out-
degree, while the inter-centrality is the product between out-
and in-degree.5 It is then clear why in Figure 1, for the case
f ′(0) = 0.1, the agent with maximum Bonacich centrality is
the one on the right (with out-degree 6) while there are two
agents with same maximum inter-centrality (with product of
out- and -in degree equals to 1 · 6). On the other hand, the
higher f ′(0) is, the more paths of higher length matters.
This explains why for f ′(0) = 1 the agents with highest
Bonacich centrality are the ones on the extreme left (i.e. the
ones from which more paths are departing). Note that the
extreme agents can never have high inter-centrality because
they always have either very low in-path weight or out-path
weight.
While in this discussion we focused on the case when the
central authority can constrain the opinion of a single agent,
formula (22) can be used to perform the same analysis for
any arbitrary number K of agents, by setting A = [e>kj ]
K
j=1.
D. Rumour propagation in opinion dynamics
As application of our theoretical results we consider a net-
work where agents exchange and update opinions regarding
a certain topic according to the Friedkin and Johnsen [26]
model of opinion dynamics
xi(t+1) =
1
1+θi
∑N
j=1 Pijx
j
(t) +
θi
1+θi y
i. (26)
Here xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the opinion of agent i at time t,
yi = xi(0) denotes its initial opinion and θ
i > 0 is a parameter
that captures its stubbornness (i.e., the weight that agent i
places on its initial opinion). It was shown in [1] that if P
is non-negative, row stochastic, Pii = 0 and θi > 0 for all
i ∈ N[1, N ] the Friedkin and Johnsen dynamics eventually
5To be rigorous we should say the in-degree plus one and the out-degree
plus one, to account for Lii = 1.
converge to the Nash equilibrium x?(y) of the NAG6 with
matrix P and cost
J i(xi, zi(x), yi) = ‖xi − zi(x)‖2 + θi‖xi − yi‖2, (27)
where zi(x) =
∑N
j=1 Pijx
j . Clearly, for y := [yi]Ni=1 = 0
all the agents have the same opinion at the Nash equilibrium
which is x?i(0) = 0. We here define rumours as perturbations
of the initial opinion of certain agents from 0 to yi > 0,
where the yi are i.i.d. with average yˆ. According to the
previously described model, at convergence, the effect of
the rumours is to modify the vector of final opinions from
x?(0) = 0 to x?(y) ≥ 0. We can then quantify how much
the rumours have spread at the end of the process by
s(y) :=
∑N
j=1 x
?j(y).
The aim of this subsection is to characterise the opinion of
which agent should the central authority constrain to 0 in
order to minimize s(y). For simplicity we consider the case
θi = θ > 0 for all i ∈ N[1, N ] and P doubly stochastic, so
that ‖P‖ ≤√‖P‖∞‖P‖1 = 1.
Note that, up to constant terms that do not depend on xi
and some positive scaling, the cost function in (27) can be
rewritten as
J i(xi, zi(x), y˜i) = 12‖xi‖2 − 1(1+θ) (zi(x) + y˜i)xi, (28)
where the y˜i := θyi are i.i.d. with average θyˆ. Then (28)
belongs to the class of NAGs discussed in this section with
f(x) = x/(1 + θ), g(h) = h, h(xi) = xi, α = 11+θ > 0 and
F (x, y˜) = (I − 11+θP )x − 1(1+θ) y˜. Note that ∇xF (x, y˜) =
(I − 11+θP ) and f ′(x) = 11+θ =: γ < 1 for all x ∈ X .
Consequently, γ‖P‖ ≤ 11+θ < 1. Assumptions 1, 2 and
6 are thus met. Assumption 4 is always met because we
consider only equality constraints. By the previous discussion
the central authority should then constrain the opinion of
the agent k with maximum inter-centrality. Note that since
F (x, y) is linear both in x, y this result holds globally (i.e.
even for large rumors).
V. ATOMIC ROUTING GAMES WITH INFORMATION
CONSTRAINTS
A. The setting
As a second application, we consider routing games in
which N atomic agents select how to split their traffic across
the available routes in a traffic network, with the goal of
minimizing their travel time, under the assumption that the
latter depends on the overall congestion level of the network.
Specifically, we consider a directed graph (V, E) where
each node v ∈ V corresponds to a location and each directed
edge e = (u, v) ∈ E corresponds to a road connecting u to
v 6= u. We define H to be the node-edge incidence matrix of
the road network. Equivalently, given any edge e = (u, v) ∈
6Note that if P is row stochastic and the initial conditions are in the
interval [0, 1]N then under the dynamics in (26) all the opinions remain
between [0, 1]N . Consequently, the Nash equilibrium of (27) is always in
[0, 1]N without the need of explicitly adding this constraint in the game.
Fig. 2: Wheatstone road network. We assume that the agents have
the same origin and destination, oi = 1, di = 4 for all i ∈ N[1, N ],
but they have different sets of information. Specifically, some agents
know all the network (for them Ei := E := {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) and some
agents do not know edge 5 (for them Ei := {1, 2, 3, 4} ⊂ E).
E , Hk,e = −1 if k = u, Hk,e = 1 if k = v and Hk,e = 0
otherwise.
We assume that each agent i ∈ N[1, N ] has a non-
negligible (atomic)7 amount of flow ηi > 0 that he needs
to assign to the available routes between an origin node
oi ∈ V and a destination node di ∈ V . Note that the origin-
destination pair may be different for each agent. Moreover,
different from standard routing games, we assume that agent
i knows only a subset E i ⊆ E of the roads. Again this set
may be different for each agent, see Figure 2 for an example.
To model these constraints let xi ∈ R|E| be a vector whose
component xie denotes the flow that agent i is allocating on
road e. Then we say that a flow xi is feasible for agent i if
1) xi ≥ 0; 2) Hxi = hi, where hi is a vector whose entries
are all 0 except for the origin node oi that has entry −ηi
and the destination node di that has entry ηi; 3) xie = 0 for
all e /∈ E i. Note that conditions 1) and 2) are the feasibility
conditions of the standard routing game, while condition 3)
models the fact that the agents might have different sets of
information.
Set x := [xi]Ni=1 and let z(x) :=
∑N
j=1 x
j be the vector
of total edge flows. To model congestion effects we assume
that the travel time for each edge is a function pe(ze, ye) :
R≥0 × R>0 → R>0 of the total edge flow ze which might
depend on a parameter ye (i.e., number of lanes, speed limits,
etc.). The travel time experienced by agent i is therefore
given by
J i(xi, z(x), y) :=
∑|E|
e=1 pe(ze(x), y
e)xie. (29)
Note that in this application both the aggregate z(x) and
the parameter y := [ye]|E|e=1 are the same for every agent.
Since z(x) depends on the sum of the flow vectors of all the
agents this is a NAG with a matrix P whose elements are
all equal to one (not to be confused with the road network
which appears in the constraints via the incidence matrix H).
Our objective is to study the effect of the parameter y on the
total travel time
s(y) =
∑|E|
e=1 pe(ze(x
?(y)), ye)ze(x
?(y))
=: p(z(x?(y)), y)>z(x?(y))
(30)
at the Nash equilibrium x?(y) when information constraints
such those in 3) are present. Note that we defined p(z, y) :=
7See [3] for a distinction between atomic and non-atomic routing games.
[pe(ze, y
e)]
|E|
e=1. For convenience we rephrase here Defini-
tion 1 for the case of routing games.
Definition 6 (Nash equilibrium): A set of strategies
{x?i(y) ∈ X i}Ni=1 is a Nash equilibrium for the routing
game with parameter y := [ye]|E|e=1 if for all players
i ∈ N[1, N ] and all strategies xi ∈ X i we have
|E|∑
e=1
pe(z
?
e (y), y
e)x?ie (y) ≤
|E|∑
e=1
pe(x
i
e +
∑
j 6=i
x?j(y), ye)xie,
(31)
where z?e (y) :=
∑N
j=1 x
?j
e (y) is the total edge flow and
X i := {xi ∈ R|E| | xi ≥ 0, Hxi = hi, xie = 0 ∀e /∈ E i}
is the set of feasible edge flow allocations for agent i.
B. Sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium in routing games
As already noted, the atomic routing game is a NAG. The
operator associated with this game is
F (x, y) = [∇xiJ i(xi, z(x), y)>]Ni=1
= [p(z(x), y) +∇zp(z(x), y)xi]Ni=1.
(32)
We assume the following regularity condition.
Assumption 7 (Travel time functions): Suppose that
F (x, y) in (32) satisfies Assumption 2 and 3.
Remark 1: Note that for this application Pii = 1 6= 0,
hence Theorem 2 cannot be applied. Nonetheless, conditions
on the travel time functions pe(·, ye) such that Assumption 7
is satisfied have been discussed for example in [10]. As a
special case we note that, Assumption 7 is always met in
the case of affine and strictly increasing travel time functions.
We also note that Assumption 1 is always satisfied in routing
games.
Under Assumption 7, Theorem 1 guarantees the existence
of a unique Nash equilibrium for the atomic routing game.
To compute its sensitivity we need to check Assumption 4 at
the current parameter y¯. In the traffic context, this condition
ensures that, if an agent i is not using road e for the parameter
y¯ (i.e, x?ie (y¯) = 0), then for small perturbations of the param-
eter it won’t use road e also in the new equilibrium x?i(y). In
other words, the subset of the constraints {xie ≥ 0}|E|e=1 that
are active should be locally unchanged (as guaranteed by the
proof of Theorem 1 under Assumption 4).8 If we consider a
parameter y¯ such that this assumption is met, then Theorem 1
allows us to compute the Nash sensitivity
∇yx?(y¯) = −M [∇yF (x, y)]{x=x?(y¯),y=y¯} (33)
where F (x, y) is as in (32) and M,L are as defined in (5).
Note that, given x?(y¯), the matrix A of active constraints
used in (5) has the following structure
A = blkdiag({[H;R(x?i(y¯))]}Ni=1)
where R(x?i(y¯)) is a matrix constructed by adding one on
top of each other the set of canonical vectors {e>e |∀e ∈
8This strict complementarity condition is similar to the strict complemen-
tary condition commonly used in non-atomic routing games [16], [17].
E s.t. x?ie (y¯) = 0}. Intuitively, R(x?i(y¯)) models the subset
of the constraints {xie ≥ 0}|E|e=1 that are active at x?i(y¯).
From (33) one can then immediately derive the sensitivity
of the total edge flow at the Nash equilibrium,
∇yz?(y¯) =
∑N
i=1∇yx?i(y¯) = [1>N ⊗ I|E|]∇yx?(y¯) (34)
and the sensitivity of the total travel time s(y) in (30) can
immediately be computed from the sensitivity of the total
edge flow as follows
∇ys(y¯) = z?>∇yp(z?, y¯)+[p(z?, y¯)+∇zp(z?, y¯)z?]>∇yz?,
(35)
where we omitted the dependence of z?(y¯) on y¯ for sim-
plicity. Formula (35) can be used to understand which road
improvements lead, at least locally, to a higher improvement
of travel time for the whole network. In fact s(y) ≈ s(y¯) +∑|E|
e=1
∂s(y¯)
∂ye (y
e− y¯e). If we assume that a road improvement
on road e corresponds to a decrease of the parameter ye,
then (ye − y¯e) < 0 and the road that should be improved to
minimize s(y) is eˆ := arg maxe∈E
∂s(y¯)
∂ye . Note that it might
happen that ∂s(y¯)∂ye < 0 for some road e ∈ E . In this case an
improvement on road e actually leads to an increase of total
travel time. This pathological situation is known as Braess’
paradox. Formula (35) can then be used to check whether for
a specific network the Braess’ paradox occurs, as illustrated
in the next subsection.9
C. Simulation example
To illustrate the approach derived in Section V-B we con-
sider the well known Wheatstone 5 roads network illustrated
in Figure 2 with congestion functions
p(z, y) =

p1(z1)
p2(z2)
p3(z3)
p4(z4)
p5(z5, y)
 =

40
150 0 0 0 0
0 1150 0 0 0
0 0 40150 0 0
0 0 0 1150 0
0 0 0 0 y150


z1
z2
z3
z4
z5
+

0
45
0
45
0

=: C(y)z + c,
where y > 0 is a parameter affecting the travel time on
road 5.
We note that with this choice of travel time functions
Assumption 7 is satisfied because we get F (x, y) =
[C(y)z(x) + c+ C(y)xi]Ni=1 where C(y)  0 for all y > 0.
Consequently, by the properties of the Kronecker product,
∇xF (x, y) = [IN + 1N1>N ]⊗ C(y)  0,∀y > 0, (36)
since both C(y) and [IN + 1N1>N ] are positive definite.
Equation (36) is a sufficient condition for x 7→ F (x, y) to
be strongly monotone for every y > 0.
We consider a game with N = 12 agents and we assume
that each agent i has flow ηi = 12.5 and wants to go from
9We finally note that it is possible to formulate the atomic routing game
also in terms of path flows instead of edge flows (as usually done in non-
atomic games). In general however path flows are not unique at the Nash
equilibrium. Hence Theorem 1 cannot be applied to this formulation.
Fig. 3: Total travel time as a function of the cost of road 5 for a
population of size N = 12 and the road network in Fig. 2.
node 1 to 4. Moreover, we assume that only a fraction
q ∈ [0, 1] of the agents knows edge 5 (i.e., E i := E
for i ∈ [1, qN ]), while the remaining agents don’t (i.e.,
E i := {1, 2, 3, 4} for i ∈ [qN + 1, N ]). The plot at the
top of Figure 3 shows the total travel time s(y) at the
Nash equilibrium as a function of the parameter y, for the 4
different scenarios in which the percentage q of agents that
know road 5 varies in {1, 2/3, 1/3, 0}. The plot at the bottom
shows the sensitivity of s(y) computed according to (35).
First note that the Braess’ paradox is captured by the fact
that for q = 1 (i.e when all the agents know all the network)
∂s(y)
∂y is negative, that is, augmenting the cost of edge 5
decreases the total travel time. Another interesting aspect
that is illustrated by this picture is the informational Braess’
paradox [13], that is, the fact that reducing the information
given to the agents (i.e. decreasing q) actually decreases the
total travel time, with the limit result that if no agent knew
edge 5 (i.e. q = 0) then they would all be better off.
VI. CONCLUSION
By using a formula for the sensitivity of the Nash equi-
librium in terms of primal variables only, we significantly
extended previous sensitivity results on quadratic network
games and atomic routing games with information con-
straints. Moreover, our findings shed new light on the inter-
centrality or key-player measure introduced in [12]. In this
paper we focused on small variations in the cost functions
of the agents. As future direction we aim at investigating the
effect of macroscopic variations of other game primitives, as
for example the network topology.
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